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ABSTRACT. There is a wealth of literature on the design of ex post compensation mechanisms for natural disasters. However, more
research needs to be done on the manner in which these mechanisms could steer citizens toward adopting individual-level preventive
and protection measures in the face of flood risks. We have provided a comparative legal analysis of the financial compensation
mechanisms following floods, be it through insurance, public funds, or a combination of both, with an empirical focus on Belgium,
the Netherlands, England, and France. Similarities and differences between the methods in which these compensation mechanisms for
flood damages enhance resilience were analyzed. The comparative analysis especially focused on the link between the recovery strategy
on the one hand and prevention and mitigation strategies on the other. There is great potential within the recovery strategy for promoting
preventive action, for example in terms of discouraging citizens from living in high-risk areas, or encouraging the uptake of mitigation
measures, such as adaptive building. However, this large potential has yet to be realized, in part because of insufficient consideration
and promotion of these connections within existing legal frameworks. We have made recommendations about how the linkages between
strategies can be further improved. These recommendations relate to, among others, the promotion of resilient reinstatement through
recovery mechanisms and the removal of legal barriers preventing the establishment of link-inducing measures.
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INTRODUCTION
Solid mechanisms to help society recover from flood events are
crucial in any flood risk management (FRM) framework, and
financial compensation plays a central role. Flood recovery
schemes have already been analyzed in-depth from the perspective
of solidarity and accessibility (Faure 2007a, Faure and
Bruggeman 2008, Porrini and Schwarze 2014). We present results
from the European Union (EU)–funded STAR-FLOOD
(Strengthening and redesigning European flood risk practices:
towards appropriate and resilient flood risk governance
arrangements) project and go a step further to discuss the ways
in which the existing ex post compensation schemes in Belgium,
the Netherlands, England, and France enhance resilience in
combination with existing prevention and mitigation strategies.
Our aim is to propose concrete recommendations on how
synergies can be improved to provide a coherent FRM approach
in which strategies reinforce and complement, rather than
undermine, each other. Indeed, earlier comparative research has
shown that the linkages between the ex post compensation
schemes across the EU and preventing and mitigating flood (risks)
have proved to be inadequate (see, e.g., Keskitalo et al. 2014,
Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 2014, Penning-Rowsell and Priest
2015, Hudson et al. 2016).  
Diversification of FRM strategies, i.e., prevention, defense,
mitigation, preparation, and recovery, is recognized as essential
for robust and resilient flood governance arrangements (Hegger
et al. 2013) and is emphasized by the EU Floods Directive 2007/60/
EC (European Parliament, Council of the European Union 2007).
However, it is not sufficient for states to merely adopt additional
strategies and measures; to be truly effective, they need to be
complementary and aligned. We focus, therefore, on how these
different strategies interact and question whether recovery
measures, e.g., insurance or public compensation, can encourage
action by citizens to increase their resilience and promote
adaptation at the individual scale. Flood recovery is a strategy in
which the dynamics between public and private actors is highly
apparent because the FRM legal realm has an impact, to varying
degrees, on insurance schemes for natural disasters. As such, the
division of responsibilities and the role of public-private
partnerships are critical to the recovery–risk reduction nexus. For
example, in countries where private insurance offers the primary
route to cover flood risks, the government has various ways that
it may facilitate the adequate operation of the insurance scheme
vis-à-vis the flood risks, for example by providing a fallback
mechanism in case insurance caps have been exceeded (Faure
2007a). We do not aim to make normative judgments regarding
the nature of the compensation scheme applicable in the countries
an sich but, rather, point out where the vulnerabilities and
opportunities for the linkages with risk prevention and mitigation
within these systems lie. In this regard, a question also relates to
the roles of private parties, i.e., the insurers, and the public
authorities in facilitating these linkages between ex post
compensation schemes and risk prevention and mitigation.  
Two main research questions form the heart of the analysis:  
1.  How do the frameworks for ex post compensation in
Belgium, England, the Netherlands, and France promote
risk prevention and mitigation actions to reduce citizens’
exposure and vulnerability to floods, and which good
practices can be put forward? 
2.  Which legislative and policy actions can be taken at the
national level to facilitate solid linkages between ex post
compensation mechanisms and measures to promote flood
prevention and mitigation actions? 
Before delving into the comparative discussion, we will first clarify
the methodological approach we have adopted and the theoretical
backbone supporting the analysis.
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METHOD
An external comparative analysis of the legal and policy
frameworks governing ex post flood compensation in Belgium,
the Netherlands, France, and England has been undertaken. The
value of such a comparison is that it provides an opportunity to
identify best practices, as well as barriers to the linking of
strategies, and identifies the context in which a measure is, or is
not, working. The selected countries offer a range of different
approaches to flood recovery, with differing degrees of public and
private involvement, implemented within varying legal traditions.
As such, they provide a broad basis from which lessons can be
drawn and from which widely applicable recommendations can
be made. In Belgium and France, mandatory insurance product
bundling exists, although the mechanisms are sculpted differently
in terms of risk differentiation. Both systems are hybrids, in the
sense that both public and private actors play an important role.
The schemes applicable in England and the Netherlands are on
opposite sides of the flood recovery spectrum, the former being
almost exclusively governed by the private insurance industry, and
the latter fully governmentally managed.[1]  
The legal comparative research utilizes a functionalist approach
(Graziadei 2003, Siems 2014) whereby analysis starts from a
particular issue, in this case postflood compensation, and aims to
identify good practices and lessons learned (Smits 2012). Among
others, the following considerations constitute the tertium
comparationis, which is established by the common denominators
of the comparison we have made: the challenges posed by floods,
the public-private division of responsibilities conundrum
associated with the natural disaster compensation, and the
necessity to create solid links between recovery measures taken
following a flood and those aimed at minimizing societal exposure
to floods. The comparative approach has included the extensive
and systematic analysis of both historical and contemporary legal
and policy documentation by researchers within each of the
countries familiar with the FRM approaches and legal context.
To realize a functionalist approach, this analysis has been
supplemented by interviews with high-level stakeholders involved
in policy development. This has involved, for example, water
managers, insurance professionals active in organizations
representing the insurance industry, and professionals active in
financial institutions involved in product development.
Interviewees were selected to provide additional information
about the functioning of the recovery approaches in practice,
potential future developments, and insight into maximizing the
links between FRM strategies. Interviews were, in general,
recorded, transcribed, and subsequently analyzed through a
systematic coding approach, which was commonly applied to the
findings in each country (Hegger et al. 2013).[2]
SETTING THE SCENE: RESILIENCE AND THE
TRIANGLE
The main linkages we analyze are those between the strategies of
recovery and flood risk prevention and recovery and flood
mitigation (Green et al. 2013, Hegger et al. 2013:29). There are
two main reasons for this particular delineation of scope. First,
we aim to identify how individual actions by citizens can be
promoted by the recovery strategy, and the most significant
opportunities for these types of actions are situated in the
interconnections between recovery, risk prevention, and
mitigation (Figure 1). Second, we focus on actions that can be
taken before or after a flood has taken place, which is why the
flood preparation strategy, for instance crisis management, is not
a core subject of analysis.  
Flood risk prevention, hereinafter also referred to as the
“prevention strategy,” relates to all measures taken to keep people
away from the water, i.e., through spatial planning and
development control. The mitigation strategy, on the other hand,
aims at resisting or accommodating water through measures such
as adaptive building and/or flood proofing at the individual scale
(Alexander et al. 2013). In this respect, individual measures that
might be considered as falling into the category of flood defense,
such as property-level resistance measures, form part of the
mitigation strategy in the context of our research.  
For us, the concept of resilience is paramount. Social-ecological
resilience has been referred to as the ability of a certain mechanism
to develop further and reorganize following a disturbance, in casu 
floods (Folke et al. 2005). Adaptability is thus a key concept in
achieving resilience and is recognized both within the context of
environmental policy sciences (Dietz et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005,
Nelson et al. 2008) and legal studies of environmental governance
(e.g., Cosens 2013, Garmestani and Benson 2013, Chaffin et al.
2014). Furthermore, one of the indicators related to resilience of
a social-ecological system is that there is sufficient coordination
across different scales and between different aspects of decision
making (Folke et al. 2005, Cosens 2010, Reed et al. 2010). As such,
for managing flood risk this means effective coordination between
the implemented FRM strategies (Cosens 2010). The linkage
between prevention or individual mitigation and recovery is thus
an important factor in achieving resilience of a social-ecological
system. A well-developed insurance mechanism can play an
important role in FRM because it may provide stimuli for people
to steer clear of flood prone areas or take adaptive measures, while
facilitating economic recovery following flooding (Kunreuther
1996, Crichton 2008), thus increasing adaptability of the system.
Insurance schemes that are not properly designed can have the
opposite effect and negatively impact society’s capacity to cope
with future flood risk (Surminski et al. 2015). For example, it has
been argued that universal insurance coverage could encourage
further development in flood risk areas (Pryce 2011), and the
availability of insurance, without conditions, could discourage
proactive risk reduction because it acts as a buffer for recovering
from flood events. One of the most apparent barriers to the
promotion of flood risk reduction by insurance schemes is the
absence of risk-reflective premiums (Blanchard-Boehm et al.
2001, Priest 2014). Also, pursuant to what Kunreuther (2008) has
referred to as “the natural disaster syndrome,” stakeholders are
not inclined to voluntarily take disaster risk reduction measures
because of notions of risk denial or displacement. The particular
nature of ex post compensation for floods thus requires a well-
thought-through synergy between and within several axes,
namely, (1) the promulgation of rules and regulations issued by
the state and reliance on the private market; (2) several sectors,
such as spatial planning, water management, and insurance; and
(3) the responsibilities of private citizens and compensatory
bodies such as the state and insurers.  
Our goal is to evaluate whether the respective triangles in the
selected countries enhance flood resilience and provide
recommendations to increase this resilience. Key criteria for this
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Fig. 1. The linkage between flood risk management strategies.
evaluation are summarized in Table 1. Existing research (e.g.,
Michel-Kerjan 2001, Faure 2007b, Botzen and Van Den Bergh
2008, Mehlhorn and Hausmann 2012, Porrini and Schwarze 2014,
Priest 2014) provides some examples of indicators, which are
herein used to identify and evaluate the current links between
recovery and other FRM strategies. Analysis then identifies the
extent to which these links are present and effective in practice.
Other potential and realized linkages have also emerged from the
empirical research conducted.
Ex post compensation for floods in Belgium, England, the
Netherlands, and France
Table 2 provides an overview of the basic characteristics of the
existing ex post compensation mechanisms in the selected
countries. The first characteristic relates to the question of
involvement of public and private parties. The Netherlands has
both a governmental compensation scheme, the Calamities
Compensation Act (CCA; Act of 25 May 1998 on the Regulations
on Contribution for the Damage and the Costs in Case of
Freshwater Flooding, Earthquakes or Other Catastrophes and
Large Accidents, Stert. 11 June 1998), and private flood insurance,
the Neerlandse. The public compensation approach is more
significant, and further analysis presented will mainly concentrate
on this mechanism. For France, Belgium, and England, ex post
compensation is dominated by market-based insurance
mechanisms with varying degrees of involvement of state actors.
The second characteristic relates to the question of whether, in
the context of insurance, flood risk coverage is bundled with other
insurance policies. In the French, Belgian, and English schemes,
this coverage for flood risks is bundled with other perils, whereas
in the Netherlands, flood risk coverage is separate from other
insurance policies. The third characteristic pertains to the degree
of solidarity between citizens in the context of ex post
compensation, namely, the question of whether all citizens
contribute to the compensation mechanism or only, for example,
people at risk. In France and the Netherlands, solidarity is very
high for different reasons explained subsequently. Finally, the
question arises as to whether the countries have adopted a risk
differentiation approach, as is the case in Belgium for example.  
The Belgian and French schemes are quite similar because they
both involve the automatic and compulsory inclusion of flood
coverage in voluntary first-party property insurance policies
(Faure and Bruggeman 2008) and have a public fallback
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Table 1. Main criteria for evaluating the resilience of the triangle.
 
Main Criteria Example Indicators
The ex post compensation mechanism facilitates “keeping people away
from the water” in a structural manner.
Availability of compensation, e.g., exclusion of high-risk properties from
recovery schemes and exclusion of new buildings; affordability as a
deterrent, e.g., risk-related premiums and risk-related deductibles
The mechanism incentivizes individuals to take adaptive building measures
and retrofitting in a structural manner.
Premium reductions for uptake of individual-scale defense or mitigation
Systematic coordination and cooperation between relevant public and
private stakeholders
Structural information exchange platform, shared cartography
Link between water and flood risk management and ex post compensation Coordinated tools for identifying high-risk zones, implications for both ex
post compensation and spatial planning
Awareness raising is taking place on a structural basis about the existence
of flood risks and their implications.
Compulsory informing requirements
Legal effectiveness Legal provisions are adequately followed up and enforced.
mechanism. Up until the entry into force on 1 March 2007 of the
2005 reform of the Insurance Act, ex post compensation in
Belgium was fully sponsored through public funding, i.e., the
Natural Disasters Act of 1976 (Act of 12 July 1976 on the Repair
of Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods by Natural
Disasters, Belgian Official Journal, 13 August 1976). Since then,
flood coverage has been automatically included in the simple fire
policy for Belgian citizens, i.e., the Insurance Act of 2014. The
Belgian insurance market thus upholds mandatory product
bundling. Fire policies are not obligatory but are taken up by
90%-95% of the population (Colle 2006). Furthermore, fire policy
coverage is generally a condition for obtaining a mortgage, which
in part explains the high penetration. The previously solo
operating mechanism, the Disaster Fund, is retained and acts as
a fallback mechanism for damages to goods that are not covered
by the simple fire insurance coverage, e.g., for goods that are not
considered as simple risks (Bruggeman 2010). The Disaster Fund
also intervenes if  the limits of the insurers have been exceeded,
because the amount that insurers are expected to pay out for a
particular event is capped (Natural Disasters Act of 1976, article
34). Following the Sixth State Reform, the Disaster Fund was
transferred from the federal level to the regional level (Special Act
of 6 January 2014 on the Sixth State Reform, Belgian Official
Journal, 31 January 2014), and insurance-related issues remained
at the federal level. For floods that have occurred before 1 July
2014, the federal mechanism of the Disaster Fund applies, and
for disasters after that date, the mechanisms applicable in the three
regions, i.e., Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region,
will apply. However, the system is relatively untested, and there
still remains a large degree of uncertainty about the details of this
transfer in relation to many issues including the competences for
declaring a flood as a natural disaster and the financial means to
provide compensation. The activation of the insurance
mechanisms in Belgium for simple risks does not depend on the
acknowledgment of the flood event as a natural disaster. For
floods that occurred at the time when ex post compensation was
still exclusively effectuated through public funding, these
declarations through royal decree were important. Still today,
even though compensation via insurance does not depend on a
state declaration, compensation provided through the Disaster
Fund does.  
The Belgian ex post compensation system is based on the French
system, albeit with a different approach to solidarity. In both
countries, solidarity is high because of the automatic inclusion of
flood risks within fire policies. The “compulsory” nature of these
insurance schemes can be highlighted as an important aid to
recovery (Van den Bergh and Faure 2006, Lamond and Penning-
Rowsell 2014). However, the difference in the solidarity approach
adopted by the respective countries lies in the differentiation in
the Belgian scheme between buildings located in high-risk zones
and those in lower risk areas. In comparison, in France, all citizens
pay a single rate, with the amount calculated as a proportion of
the base policy, set forth through ministerial decree, regardless of
their exposure to flood risk.  
In France, for a long time, damages caused by natural disasters
such as floods, earthquakes, or droughts were not compensated
though insurance contracts because of their recurring and
unpredictable character. Public authorities granted public
subsidies on a case-by-case basis. Following the disastrous 1981
floods, in 1982 the French Parliament adopted a law creating a
public-private partnership between insurance companies and the
state to compensate damages resulting from natural disasters: the
Catastrophes Naturelles (CAT-NAT) regime. Flood risks are
covered in first-party insurance policies for buildings and movable
property (Bruggeman 2010). Twelve percent of the proceeds of
the insurance premiums are then redistributed between insurance
companies and the Central Reinsurance Company (CCR), a
reinsurance company fully owned by the state. Insurers realize
they need to compensate material damages following a natural
disaster event, regardless of the amount to be paid; therefore, they
purchase reinsurance to cover their own risk exposure, either
through the CCR or a private reinsurer. The advantage of the
CCR is that it offers unlimited coverage because of the guarantee
of the French state. In contrast to the Belgian scheme, there is no
limit to the governmental fallback mechanism. Recently, this
characteristic has been brought before the French Constitutional
Council through a priority preliminary ruling on constitutionality
to test if  this unlimited coverage creates a competitive advantage.
On 27 September 2013, the Constitutional Council considered
that this advantage does not constitute a breach of the freedom
of entrepreneurship or the equality principle, both of which are
protected by the French constitution. This decision is a clear
illustration of the primacy of public over private interests. Finally,
in France, the compensation of damages following floods by
insurers depends on the acknowledgment of the flood as a natural
disaster through an administrative decision.  
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Table 2. Overview of ex post compensation mechanisms for floods in the selected countries.
 
Belgium France England: Flood Re The NetherlandsType of
Compensation
CCA Neerlandse
Both: Both: Mainly private: Public Private
Private insurance
mechanism with public
fallback mechanism + set
of regulations related to
risk differentiation, etc.
 
Private insurance
mechanism with public
fallback mechanism + set of
regulations related to
insurance fees, etc.
Private insurance mechanism
with formal cross-
subsidization via a pooled
system
Public-private divide
Bundled: Bundled: Bundled: N/A
Mandatory product
bundling but within a
voluntary insurance policy
(fire)
 
Mandatory product
bundling but within a
voluntary insurance policy
(fire)
 
Bundled with homeowner
insurance (standard peril)
Bundled/unbundled
(level of
compulsion)
Unbundled and
optional
High: Very high: High: Very high: Low:
Because flood risk
coverage is included in fire
insurance, 90%-95% of the
citizens pay, regardless of
whether a person lives on
the 40th floor of an
apartment building or not.
 
All citizens pay a single rate,
regardless of their exposure
to flood risks.
However, only between the
insured
All citizens
contribute through
taxes.
Completely optional
Degree of solidarity
Yes: Not explicitly: Yes: Yes
No ceiling on insurance fee
+ possibility for insurers to
refuse coverage for those
buildings built in a flood
prone area after 23
September 2008
Considering the application
of the single rate, regardless
of the exposure to flood
risks
Flood Re aims to gradually
increase premiums.
Risk differentiation Outside the dike
area
CCA, Calamities Compensation Act; N/A, not available.
Whereas Belgium and France have varying degrees of public
intervention in the existing insurance schemes, the English
scheme has been more private in nature. Flood insurance has
been available as part of a standard household policy for many
decades, and the system of its provision has been relatively stable
(Penning-Rowsell and Priest 2015). In part, this stability was
created by an informal agreement, the “Gentleman’s
Agreement” (BIA/FOC 1961), between members of the
insurance industry and the government, in which the universality
of insurance provision was guaranteed. In more recent years,
this arrangement was replaced by a series of further agreements,
the Statement of Principles (e.g., ABI 2008), in which the UK
government committed to strengthening spatial planning and
constructing flood defenses in return for continued universal
coverage. There are multiple reasons for the need to move from
a system based on informal agreements toward a new approach
to flood insurance, including concerns about maintaining the
affordability of insurance, changes to the marketplace and the
entrance of new insurers, industry concerns about repeated
losses, and the general consideration by the insurance industry
that government has not acted sufficiently to prevent
inappropriate development and mitigate flood risks (Huber
2004, Lamond et al. 2009, O’Neill and O’Neill 2012, Ball et al.
2013, Surminski and Eldridge 2014, Penning-Rowsell and Priest
2015).  
Introduced in April 2016, the Flood Reinsurance Scheme (Flood
Re) represents the largest change to insurance provision in
England in almost 100 years (Penning-Rowsell and Priest 2015).
The introduction of Flood Re aims to maintain the affordability
and availability of flood insurance to domestic properties through
the pooling of higher risks. The new approach, legislated via the
Water Act of 2014 (chapter 21, part 4) and additional secondary
legislation, The Flood Reinsurance (Scheme and Scheme
Administrator Designation) Regulations 2015 (Statutory
Instrument No. 1875), establishes a not-for-profit reinsurance
fund from which private insurance companies will be allowed to
draw to settle claims for those properties that they have chosen
to cede to the scheme. Flood Re permits a graduated and banded
premium cap to be placed on domestic properties and, as such,
subsidizes the premium costs of high-risk households (Defra
2013). The Flood Re pool will be fully managed by the insurance
industry, although regulated by the government, and is funded
through premiums of those properties ceded into the scheme and
a levy payable by all private insurers providing domestic insurance
policies. The amount each insurer contributes is based on the
insurer’s market share. It has been estimated that this levy for each
of the first 5 years will be on the order of £180 million (Defra
2013). Those insurance professionals interviewed suggested that
this levy will likely be passed on to consumers, and therefore, all
who have a household insurance policy will contribute and cross-
subsidize those at high flood risk, albeit by differing amounts.
The degree of solidarity in England is thus relatively high, with
insurance penetration at ∼70%; however, it exists only between
those insured because there is no other formalized compensation
scheme.  
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Whereas Belgium, France, and England rely on the private
insurance market for the bulk of compensation offered for
damages resulting from floods, the Netherlands adopts a different
approach. Analysis of flood risk policy shows that the recovery
strategy in the Netherlands is the least developed in comparison
to the other FRM strategies, a view confirmed by interviews. This
is because the focus is based on protection from floods using
defense infrastructure. This can in part be explained by geographic
circumstances because the Netherlands is a low-lying delta with
large flood prone areas in which most of the population lives and
works. Thus, should a flood occur, the extent of damage would
be unimaginably high, which is why after the 1953 floods,
insurance companies declared flood risks uninsurable. The strong
focus on protection strategies implies that the recovery scheme
functions as a measure of last resort. In this circumstance, the
CCA may be enacted. This is an exclusive governmental
competence; water management in the Netherlands is the
responsibility of the government, with water authorities having
a constitutional duty to keep people who live in dike-protected
areas safe from harm. If  the CCA is triggered, a specific regulation
comes into force, which is created for the specific situation.
Individuals may request compensation for part of their loss.
However, the CCA has only been declared applicable five times
since 1998. The recovery compensation regime is based on the
principle of solidarity; it is funded through general means, with
all Dutch citizens contributing (Explanatory Memorandum to
the CCA, Kamerstukken II, 25 159, no. 3). The CCA is only
applicable in cases in which flooding has been formally declared
to be a disaster, so for smaller floods, no compensation will be
provided (Hartlief  2014). The CCA mechanism has been
criticized for being ad hoc and for the lack of clear and transparent
provisions regarding the compensation of victims (Bruggeman
2011).  
In the 1950s, the Dutch insurers made a binding agreement in
which they agreed not to cover damage as a result of flooding.
Even though this agreement can be considered as a prohibited
cartel, the insurers continue refusing coverage, without a
substantial contribution of the state (Hartlief  2014). Despite this,
in 2011, a pilot insurance policy was launched, the Neerlandse,
with the goal of making flood risks insurable. Not all types of
flooding are covered by the Neerlandse; e.g., damage caused by
pluvial flooding and by groundwater is excluded. The Neerlandse
insurance policy is only purchased by a very small percentage of
the population, and from interviews with the Association of
Dutch Insurers in 2014, it became clear that insurers are hesitant
to give detailed information about the costs because these depend
on individual circumstances.
COMPARISON OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
RECOVERY, RISK PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION IN
THE SELECTED COUNTRIES
For each of the compared countries, we examine in more detail
the degree to which there are links between recovery and the
strategies of prevention and mitigation embedded within the
approach.
Recovery and flood risk prevention
Three ex post compensation mechanisms provide for risk
differentiation and prevention promoting actions, albeit to
varying degrees. The Dutch situation differs because it has no
widespread insurance system, and the CCA provides for
compensation only in specific circumstances.  
The Belgian compensation scheme contains built-in awareness-
raising and risk differentiation mechanisms. All buildings
constructed 18 months from the date of publication of the Royal
Decree of 23 September 2008 in delineated high-risk areas do not
benefit from the maximum insurance tariffs set forth by the public
Tariff  Office (2014 Insurance Act [Act of 4 April 2014 Related to
Insurances, Belgian Official Journal, 30 April 2014], article 129
§ 3; 2007 Royal Decree Risk Zones [Royal Decree of 28 February
2007 Related to the Delineation of the Risk Zones within the
Meaning of Article 68-7 of the Act of 25 June 1992 on the Land
Insurance Contract]). This signals an effort by legislators to
discourage citizens from constructing properties in flood prone
areas, with a perspective that there should be limits to how far
solidarity should stretch. Consequently, in these areas, the cost of
premiums is at the discretion of insurers, who are not obliged to
provide coverage. Thus, the unavailability of insurance is a
potential deterrent to development. Similarly, the Disaster Fund
will not intervene for damage to buildings located in these high-
risk areas. The transfer of the Disaster Fund to the regions is an
important evolution because it implies a potential step toward
integrated FRM. A substantial part of the recovery strategy now
pertains to the same government that is responsible for flood
prevention and, in particular, proactive spatial planning.  
In comparison to the Belgian scheme, the solidarity principle is
even more vital to the French mechanism (Insurance Act of 1982).
Whereas the Belgian scheme explicitly differentiates between
buildings located in high-risk zones and those that are not, in
France, all citizens pay a single rate, regardless of their exposure
to the flood risks. Such an approach can be explained mainly by
the importance of the égalité principle in France, namely, equality
vis-à-vis government encumbrances. Each person insured is
obligated to pay an additional charge of 12% (Decree of 4 March
2009). The payment of this charge is obligatory because, as
previously mentioned, natural disasters are automatically covered
by French home and vehicle insurance policies. The French
scheme is thus at the outset inherently flawed in terms of the
linkage between the recovery and prevention strategies. The
determination of this fixed rate by the government prevents
insurance companies from adopting a premium rate calculated in
proportion to risk exposure. However, certain measures included
in the CAT-NAT scheme do have an impact on prevention. The
link between the flood risk prevention and recovery strategies is
most apparent with respect to financial resources. Indeed, 12% of
insurance proceeds are distributed to the Barnier Fund, which
finances the prevention of major natural hazards including
prevention, defense, mitigation, and preparation actions. The
rationale behind this redistribution of insurance proceeds is that
such actions decrease the exposure of insurers (Cans 2014). For
instance, the Barnier Fund finances 40% of surveys and risk
reduction work required by the community-based plans for the
prevention of natural risks (PPRI) and 50% of the studies carried
out prior to dynamic flood retention work.  
Besides financial resources, the CAT-NAT also facilitates other
links with the prevention strategy. The insurer can amend the
deductible for buildings not covered by a PPRI. The deductible
can be doubled if  a property receives compensation three times,
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tripled from the fourth time, and quadrupled from the fifth time
compensation is provided (Insurance Code, article A.125-1). The
main aim of this modulation system created in 2003 (Ministerial
Order No. 2003-08-04 of 29 August 2003 Amending the Article
A.125-1 of the Insurance Code) is to incentivize citizens to lobby
the state to adopt a PPRI to avoid any increase of the deductible
(Moréteau 2007). Despite good intentions, reports have shown
that the incentivizing effect is quite low (Hourdeau-Bodin 2015).
In insurance law, deductibles are used to encourage the insured
to take preventive actions, but there is no direct link between the
state responsible for the adoption of a PPRI and the insured.
Hence, this system is considered as unfair and not incentivizing
(Collombat 2012). Another way of linking insurance and
prevention is for an insurer to legally refuse to cover flood risk
for new properties built in areas designated as “unbuildable” by
a PPRI, i.e., if  a property is constructed in violation of the plan
(Insurance Code, article L.125-6). Additionally, insurance
companies can be exceptionally relieved from their obligation to
insure goods and activities situated in a risk area if  the insured
did not comply with any prevention and mitigation measures
contained in the applicable PPRI. To this end, the insurer should
notify this exemption of coverage to the insured and needs to gain
approval from the Tariff  Office (Insurance Code, article R.250-3).
In theory, these measures could lead to higher levels of awareness
of flood risks and stronger incentives to take prevention and
mitigation measures. However, many of these options for
deductible modulation or exclusion are not being used by insurers
(Collombat 2012, Poussin et al. 2013, Hourdeau-Bodin 2015).
These legal options miss their effect, mainly because insurers tend
to consider that it is not up to them to punish their insured clients
(interview, R. Nussbaum, head of French insurance trade
associations, 2014). Furthermore, insurance companies that may
want to use these rights must be prepared for potential reputation
damage. A 2012 legislative reform proposed to transform these
options into requirements (Impact Study Reform Insurance Act
of 2012), but Parliament has not yet adopted this reform.  
In line with the private nature of the English insurance scheme,
unlike in France and partly in Belgium, the setting of premiums
is at the discretion of each insurance company. In England, under
the pre–Flood Re system and the associated Statement of
Principles (ABI 2008), the agreement between an insurance
company and the government only pertained to maintaining
universal coverage and had no discussion of premium pricing.
However, this did not guarantee the affordability of insurance.
Even in the original “Gentleman’s Agreement” in 1961 (BIA/FOC
1961), insurance companies were free to set premiums to reflect
risk and could insist that households in higher risk zones pay more
for their insurance than those at lower, or no, risk. Despite this,
although there was an indication that those who had been flooded
were being charged increased renewal premiums (Cobbing and
Miller 2012), in general the market showed a level of distortion,
with those at higher risk not paying significantly more than those
at lower flood risk (ABI 2010). Flood Re aims to eliminate this
distortion by gradually increasing the risk reflectiveness of
premiums over the coming years and reducing this cross-
subsidization. Transitioning to risk-reflective premiums is
recognized as challenging (Hudson et al. 2016), and Flood Re is
a transition scheme to provide time (20-25 years) for property
owners to take action to reduce risk and, consequently, rising
insurance premiums (Defra 2013).  
The insurance scheme indirectly provides some discouragement
from building in high-risk areas because flood insurance is one
of the determining factors for assessing the mortgagability of a
property, and therefore ultimately the ability to sell it (Surminski
et al. 2015). Additionally, the ties to prevention are strengthened
through the exclusion of new properties, i.e., those built after
January 2009, from the premium capping and cross-subsidization
that Flood Re affords high-risk properties. Solicitors’ best practice
guidelines indicate that flood risk should be considered in
conveyancing transactions (The Law Society 2016), and sellers
are required to declare known flood risk and occurrences.
However, this is an area that requires strengthening because other
considerations often outweigh flood risk. Pryce et al. (2011) argue
that house prices do not sufficiently reflect levels of flood risk and
that the continued availability and subsidizing of insurance have
made the housing market somewhat insensitive to flood risks (Ball
et al. 2013), thereby undermining efforts to prevent increasing
flood risks.  
In the Netherlands, compensation is paid from general
government funds, so no differentiation is made between where
people live. The default situation is that areas are protected by
dikes. Within these areas, a duty of care of the government to
provide legally binding flood safety standards exists. Damages
occurring in areas outside the protection of the flood defense
structures are not entitled to compensation based on the CCA.
The pilot insurance scheme, the Neerlandse, adopts risk
differentiation because it determines the costs of the premiums
based on, among other things, the available flood risk maps. The
added value of an insurance scheme in the Netherlands has been
subject to debate for years. Aerts (2009) stated that the surplus
value of such an insurance regime would be that people who are
living outside a dike-protected area would be compensated.
However, if  this insurance coverage were not mandatory, the
premiums might become too high for those people to bear. Only
mandatory insurance whereby inhabitants of the “safe” areas
contribute to insurance costs would alleviate this affordability
barrier. However, from a national perspective, the value of
introducing a mandatory insurance regime for all Dutch citizens
in addition to the existing CCA is questionable considering the
small percentage of people living outside the dike areas.
Recovery and flood mitigation
Whereas the prevention strategy is, albeit not always explicitly, a
factor in all four of the ex post compensation mechanisms, the
link between flood recovery and flood mitigation is weaker. For
instance, the Belgian ex post mechanism establishes a clear link
with preventing flood risks by discouraging people from building
in high-risk areas; however, it is deficient in promoting mitigation
measures. The Insurance Act makes no reference to incentives for
policyholders to adopt adaptive building measures. Whether these
types of measures are taken into account, e.g., in terms of
premium benefits, is at the discretion of individual insurers
(Bruggeman 2011). In general, premium differentiation is
inherent to the functioning of insurance schemes; however, this
does not correspond to a systematic consideration of mitigation
measures in the ex post compensation schemes analyzed.
Moreover, there are no provisions for dealing with buildings in
designated high-risk areas that may be excluded from coverage or
premium capping but that have been built adaptively or have been
flood proofed. Insurers are hesitant to take into account measures
requiring human interaction, especially with regard to already
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existing buildings, whereas structural measures carried out at the
time of construction are more commonly included in an insurer’s
risk assessment (telephone interview, insurance professional from
the umbrella organization for insurers, 2015). This is one of the
factors of uncertainty because it is often not clear how specific
flood-proofing measures decrease the flood risks (Keskitalo et al.
2014). Empirical evidence, not only in Belgium but also at a
broader geographic scale, on if  and how risk reduction measures
are being taken and their level of effectiveness is lacking (Hudson
et al. 2016). Initiatives have been taken by the Flemish authorities
to develop a scoring system for preventive measures taken for
individual properties (interview, civil servants from the Flemish
Environment Agency [Vlaamse Milieumaatschappij, or VMM],
2014), but these have not yet been realized or translated into
practice.  
In France, adaptive building is not a factor that is taken into
account in a structural and transparent manner in the CAT-NAT
regime. However, the risk reduction plans are supposed to, in
theory, promote mitigation measures. One possibility to
strengthen the link between compensation and mitigation is to
condition the compensation of damages to the effectiveness and
efficacy of the mitigation measures adopted prior to the
occurrence of the natural disaster to incentivize public and private
actors. Attempts have been made to link compensation to the
adoption of specific measures. Article L.125-1 of the Insurance
Code states that compensation is possible only if  traditional
mitigation measures were not sufficient to prevent the risk, a
condition that is strictly interpreted by the courts. The fault of
the insured must be sought to deprive them from the CAT-NAT
guarantee (Cass. 2e civ., 13 January 2012, Mr. and Mrs. X., req.
no. 10-28.003). For instance, this fault exists when damages could
have been avoided if  facilities had been built correctly (Cass. 1re
civ., 7 February 1995, Cie La Bâloise, req. no. 91-16.706). For
buildings located in an area that is not covered by a PPRI, the
Insurance Code stipulates that compensation received following
floods can only be used to retrofit buildings (article L.121-17).
These restoration measures are prescribed by the mayor of the
area in question. This restrictive interpretation does not
encourage households to act in a proactive way to protect
themselves against floods (Hourdeau-Bodin 2015). Hudson et al.
(2016) argue that incentivizing mitigation in France is weakened
by the lack of risk-reflective pricing, and until greater premium
differentiation is implemented, there is unlikely to be much
positive progress in this regard (Poussin et al. 2013).  
Currently, in England, Flood Re does not explicitly provide for
mitigation measures as part of the insurance policy (Surminski
and Eldridge 2014). Under both the pre–Flood Re approach and
the new system, properties are, in theory, able to benefit via a
premium reduction from flood proofing or other risk reduction
measures. Whether a premium reduction is available, as well as
what is included or excluded and the amount of any deductible,
is at the discretion of the individual insurer. Evidence suggests,
however, that the numbers of properties that have actually
benefited in such a way is limited (Bell 2011, Cobbing and Miller
2012). To date, it has been quite difficult for households to achieve
a premium reduction, in part, because premiums for many have
been disproportionately low (ABI 2010); therefore, it is only where
premiums have been very large or properties excluded from
coverage because of repeated flooding that there is the scope for
reductions. Under Flood Re, the aim is to transition to a situation
whereby premiums reflect flood risk; hence, with higher risks there
should be more possibility for incentivizing risk reduction at the
household scale. Despite this, there are still significant barriers to
be overcome. To benefit, households often will have to submit
evidence, generally via a privately commissioned survey, to
demonstrate the reduction of the risk presented by any household
measure (Cobbing and Miller 2012). Similar to the insurers in
Belgium, both insurance professional interviewees and other
studies (e.g., Ball et al. 2013, Flood Re 2016) suggest that despite
the growing evidence base (JBA Consulting 2012, Defra 2014,
Environment Agency 2015), concern remains within the
insurance industry about the effectiveness of such property-scale
risk reduction and that some measures are contingent on action
to reduce damages, e.g., shutting of gates or installation of flood
doors. As such, there is no guarantee that these measures will be
implemented in time and result in damage reduction. Monitoring
and enforcing these actions will be difficult for insurers and
introduce increased administrative costs, which would make any
reduction in premiums less attractive. Furthermore, Ball et al.
(2013) indicate that insurers find it difficult to account for the
effects of some of these measures in terms of pricing and that the
competitiveness of the market means that profits are low and
there is little space to offer reductions (Thieken et al. 2006).
Although incentivizing risk reduction is considered as one of the
key benefits of Flood Re, the first transition plan (Flood Re 2016)
provides little detail about how some of the aforementioned
barriers will be overcome.  
Similar to the other countries studied, in the Netherlands,
mitigation measures are not structurally anchored in the ex post
compensation mechanisms. First, according to the terms of the
insurance policy, the value of the insured property is determined
by the “home contents and rebuilding value indicator” of the
Neerlandse or a taxation report of a sworn broker or assessor.
The premium cost is also determined by the location of the
property and its flood risk profile. According to the publicly
available information, the presence of adaptive measures does not
systematically form part of the determination of premium cost.
There have been suggestions to lower taxes raised by water
authorities to fund flood defense work for those who have reduced
their own risk. However, this of course relates to prevention or
defense, rather than being explicitly linked to recovery. Second,
the CCA does not promote mitigation at the individual scale. This
introduces the notion of “charity hazard” (Raschky and Weck-
Hannemann 2007), which suggests that if  citizens can rely on
compensation for damages, there will be less incentive to try to
either purchase insurance or reduce their risk. However, the CCA
is viewed as a last resort because of the extensive focus on
prevention and defense. Furthermore, the CCA does not
compensate for all losses and is enacted infrequently, so the degree
to which households are discouraged from risk reduction by the
presence of this mechanism is limited. Because the government
is not willing to make radical changes to this system, in the near
future the recovery strategy will not by itself  stimulate adaptive
building. However, the notion of individual adaptation is
complicated by the Dutch geographic situation. Some areas are
at risk from such deep flooding, e.g., more than 3 m, that it would
be infeasible to reduce flood risks through individual property
mitigation measures; therefore, for some households, self-
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mitigation options are limited. For those who own property
outside the dike rings, there might be an incentive to take
mitigation measures because in these areas the water authorities
have no duty of care to protect against floods. Because not every
flood will be designated as a “disaster” under the CCA, residents
of these unprotected areas, mostly farmers, have already been
adopting mitigation measures and are familiar with the risks of
flooding. More problematic are new residents in unprotected
areas who are less aware of flood risks. A possible way of creating
more adaptive building would be by virtue of awareness
campaigns, the use of subsidies, or building requirements.  
Finally, public-private synergies, i.e., the manner in which the
legislative and policy frameworks interact with market-based
flood insurance, are important aspects of the linkages we
analyzed. In Belgium, one of the recommendations identified by
the evaluation of the 2010 floods for the Flemish region was that
the VMM, which manages the first-category nonnavigable
watercourses, and the major actors in the insurance market
should cooperate more firmly (VMM 2011). More specifically,
it was suggested that an agreement should be made between
water managers and Assuralia, the Belgian professional
association of insurance companies, with the goal of mutually
sharing data on natural disasters. However, this agreement has
not been finalized hitherto. Concerns have been raised by certain
water managers, e.g., civil servants from the VMM, involved in
the development of the preventive instruments that they do not
have a clear view on how the insurance sector calculates the
relevant fees applicable in risk prone areas (interview, civil
servants from the VMM, 2014). There also seems to be a
discrepancy in how building in flood prone areas is perceived by
the stakeholders’ active in the context of the prevention or
mitigation strategy and the insurance industry. In the insurance
realm, it would be difficult to introduce a mechanism whereby
premiums would be lowered for buildings that are in flood prone
areas but are built adaptively because, as previously mentioned,
the effectiveness of the measures is still uncertain. However, the
stakeholders active in the water management sector argue that
certain measures are robust enough to justify a decrease in
premiums, for example, building techniques to raise the
threshold of properties (interview, insurance professional
responsible for product management in Belgian bank, 2014).
Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the
effectiveness of some individual-scale mitigation measures is
greater than initially evaluated and that they can lead to
substantial reductions in flood damages (Poussin et al. 2015),
although the effectiveness varies between different flood
characteristics. In any case, water management stakeholders
acknowledge that there is a need for better cooperation with the
insurance sector (interview, civil servants from the VMM, 2014).  
Table 3 provides a summary of the analysis of existing
instruments linking flood risk prevention and recovery and flood
mitigation and recovery. Furthermore, this table contains
references to measures that, to date, are not being used by the
four countries that we have discussed but that, if  implemented,
might better operationalize recovery-prevention-mitigation
synergies (see, e.g., Priest 2014, Surminski and Eldridge 2014,
Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2015, Linnerooth-Bayer and
Hochrainer-Stigler 2015, Surminski et al. 2015, Hudson et al.
2016). The analysis previously mentioned and presented in Table
3 forms the basis for recommendations for strengthening the links
between strategies and creating a more resilient triangle.
LESSONS LEARNED FOR A RESILIENT TRIANGLE
Evaluative criteria have been used to highlight the extent to which
other individual-level FRM strategies are linked to flood recovery
mechanisms. Resilience against flooding can be maximized where
the varying strategies used to manage flood risk are coordinated
and provide reinforcing actions. Ensuring that one strategy does
not undermine the effectiveness of another will provide the most
effective and efficient outcomes from FRM. Analysis has shown
that despite the great potential for linking and aligning flood risk
strategies, the four countries analyzed are not maximizing this
potential fully (see Table 3). All countries do, however, have some
linkages between recovery and other FRM strategies, and there
are examples of good practices, which might be transferred
between countries and are applicable more widely. Additionally,
these examples provide insights into the obstacles to linkage,
which can be used to highlight opportunities for strengthening
existing links or creating new ties.  
Figure 2 summarizes the types of measures that are possible for
linking recovery strategies with risk prevention, i.e., through
keeping people and property out of the flood risk zone, and
recovery with individual-level mitigation, i.e., through
incentivizing individuals to reduce the risk to their properties. The
numbered list in Figure 2 provides examples of the structural legal
and/or policy mechanisms that in some cases are being used or
could be adopted elsewhere to better improve these linkages and
more effectively integrate and align FRM strategies.
Prevention and recovery: discouraging building in high-risk areas
Preventing the exposure of people and property is a critical
component of any comprehensive FRM approach. Recovery
mechanisms offer a large potential for disincentivizing new
development away from flood risk areas, particularly high flood
risk areas. It should also be ensured that recovery mechanisms do
not undermine development control strategies that aim to prevent
increasing flood risk exposure. A good practice in this area is the
Belgian system, whereby, on the basis of the Insurance Act, (1)
insurers can refuse coverage for those buildings constructed in
high-risk areas after 23 September 2008, or if  they do cover, (2)
the governmentally set cap on the insurance fee does not apply.
These actions are effective because, among others, the measures
are legally enshrined within the recovery mechanism (Figure 2,
point 1). A similar example of this nature comes from the Flood
Re scheme, whereby properties built after 1 January 2009 are
excluded from the premium capping and the cross-subsidization
offered. It is good practice to try to prevent increasing the problem
in high-risk areas, but, particularly in the United Kingdom, until
house prices become more sensitive to flood risk, significant
disincentives to (re)develop or reside in flood risk areas are
unlikely (Pryce et al. 2011, Ball et al. 2013). Without stronger links
to house value, recovery mechanisms may continue to fail to
discourage increasing development in flood risk areas.
Mitigation and recovery: general
In terms of the link between individual-scale mitigation and
recovery measures, there is still potential to strengthen links
because none of the four analyzed schemes have been successful
in establishing strong and systematic requirements (Figure 2,
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Table 3. Evaluation of linkages in the selected countries.
 
Evaluation
Criteria
Indicators/Possibilities
for Facilitating
Linkage between
Strategies
Belgium France England Netherlands
CCA Neerlandse
Strategy of prevention:
The ex post compensation mechanism facilitates “keeping people away from the water” in a structural manner.
Possibility for insurers/
compensation
mechanism to exclude
property in high-risk
areas
Yes, for buildings
built after 23
September 2008
No, all citizens
contribute
Yes, but little evidence
of occurrence
Yes, only outside the
dike area
N/A (not
regulated)
Exclusion of new
properties from
insurance
No No Partly; new properties
after January 2009 are
excluded from
premium capping.
No No
Mechanism of
excluding content from
coverage based on risk
Is possible Is possible Is possible, but little
evidence of
implementation
N/A Is possible
Deductibles can be
modulated based on
risk
Yes, but cap
pursuant to
Insurance Act
Yes, but only if  there is
no PPRI covering the
risk area
Is possible, but little
evidence of occurrence
N/A Is possible
Strategy of mitigation:
The mechanism incentivizes individuals to take adaptive building measures and retrofitting in a structural manner.
Participation in
mechanism is based on
prevention, defense, or
mitigation measures.
No In theory, but not
applied
Generally, no; but in
principle insurers could
require measures for
insurability
No Not stipulated
Premiums take into
account adaptive
building measures.
Discretion of
insurer
Discretion of insurer Discretion of insurer No Possibly
Mechanism to ensure
that compensation
received following
floods is used to
retrofit building
No Possibly, for areas not
covered by PPRI
Not present in the
policy and currently
not part of Flood Re,
but repair and renew
grants aimed to do this.
No No
Systematic cooperation and coordination between public and private actors
Sharing of data,
alignment of
cartography
Data are
considered
commercially
sensitive, so little
data sharing.
Yes Data are considered
commercially sensitive,
so little data sharing.
Yes, but only in the
way that all data are
freely accessible
Yes; they use
publicly
provided data
and flood
maps.
Link between water management and ex post compensation scheme
Bridging mechanisms
to establish the link
between the two
sectors, e.g., tools for
identifying high-risk
zones, implications for
both ex post
compensation and
spatial planning
Link as a result of
insurance
restrictions for
buildings built
after 23 September
2008, no
structural bridging
mechanisms
Yes, e.g., Barnier Fund
and PPRI
Much engagement
between the insurers’
representatives and
authorities
No direct link
because of the formal
responsibility of
water managers to
ensure protection
against floods; no
direct link between ex
post compensation
and spatial planning
Yes; they use
publicly
provided data
and flood
maps.
Awareness raising is taking place on a structural basis about the existence of flood risks and their implications.
Compulsion of
insurance uptake
In theory, no; in
practice, yes
Partly yes; landlords do
not have to insure
themselves, except for
coownership spaces, but
tenants have to insure
themselves.
Building insurance is
required for a
mortgage; otherwise,
no. However, generally
high penetration.
N/A No
(con'd)
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Instruments raising
awareness for flood
risks, e.g., as an
obligatory element of a
real estate
advertisement/
transaction
Yes, in the water
management
sphere in
Flanders; the duty
to inform
Yes, through the state of
natural and
technological hazards
(duty to inform). The
state of natural and
technological hazards
must be given by
landlords to tenants
before the signature of
the leasing agreement
and to buyers before the
signature of the deal of
sale.
Yes; sellers are required
to declare known flood
risk and occurrences.
Solicitors’ best practice
guidance suggests it
should be considered,
but there is scope to
strengthen this process.
No, only general
awareness-raising
campaigns
No
Legal effectiveness
Legal provisions are
adequately followed up
and enforced.
General issue of
enforcement
bottleneck in the
water
management
sphere
Insufficient Flood Re: Legal
requirements exist, e.g.,
to implement
transition plan, but it is
unclear how effective
these will be at
achieving goals.
Yes, but the CCA is
effective only in those
cases in which a flood
has been designated
as a disaster, and it
will not compensate
all damage to
everyone.
N/A
CCA, Calamities Compensation Act; N/A, not available; PPRI, community-based plans for the prevention of natural risks.
point 2). In England, one of goals of Flood Re is to increase
household ownership of flood risk and encourage individual risk
reduction action (Defra 2013). The current Flood Re
implementation plan (Flood Re 2016) insufficiently describes how
to overcome some of the recognized barriers to implementation
of risk reduction, including awareness of suitable measures to
reduce risk (Kunreuther et al. 2013); the benefits of doing so and
the cost-effectiveness of measures in reducing damages
(Kunreuther 1996, Kunreuther et al. 2013, Poussin et al. 2015);
and whether any incentives offered, such as premium reductions,
are sufficient to promote action (Thieken et al. 2006, Ball et al.
2013). A best practice from the French insurance system is the
link between CAT-NAT and the funding of large-scale defense
and mitigation, through the financing of the Barnier Fund (Cans
2014). However, a criticism of the approach is that it does not do
enough at the individual level to promote and incentivize
mitigation (Michel-Kerjan 2001, Poussin et al. 2013, Hudson et
al. 2016). In a fully public compensation scheme, as in the
Netherlands, significant incentives for reducing flood risks are
likely situated outside the scope of the recovery strategy and are
addressed more traditionally by flood defense and risk
management. Indeed, because of the low penetration of flood
insurance in the Netherlands, if  a financial incentive were to be
granted, the direct provision of household subsidies for mitigation
would likely be more successful than any modification of
premiums (interview, Association of Dutch Insurers, 19
November 2014).
Legislative reforms to improve linkages
Those schemes analyzed have highlighted that there are existing
legal barriers (see Figure 2, point 5) impeding the effectiveness of
linkages between ex post compensation mechanisms and
prevention and mitigation. As described previously, in England,
the presence of financial rules and the Competition Act of 1998
has been a barrier for insurers from working together to mandate
mitigation (Priest et al. 2005). However, there is more scope in the
new Flood Re approach to make improvements in this area
because it brings insurers together through the pooling of risks.
The lack of transparency in the declaration procedure
acknowledging a flood event as a natural disaster currently
hampers legitimacy within the French CAT-NAT regime. The
criteria for such an acknowledgment have not been set out through
legislative instruments and are often considered as biased and
partisan. The elaboration of clear, strict, and exhaustive criteria
would overcome this bottleneck. Moreover, in France, the
promotion of mitigation measures could be improved through
legislative reform of the Insurance Act. Penalizing violations of
prevention and mitigation measures set forth by the relevant PPRI
could be made mandatory instead of optional. Furthermore,
CAT-NAT premium rates could be differentiated based on the
consideration of whether prevention and mitigation measures
have been adopted. Suggestions have been made to differentiate
the set premium rates according to the situation of households
(Dumas et al. 2005, Cour des Comptes 2009, Poussin et al. 2013,
Hourdeau-Bodin 2015, Hudson et al. 2016). To maintain the
constitutional solidarity principle, a reduced rate of 9% could be
proposed for households situated in no-risk territories. For those
insured households located in a flood zone, an intermediate rate
of 12% could be applied if  they declare themselves in compliance
with regulatory requirements contained in the PPRI. For those
who do not respect the aforementioned requirements, a higher
rate of 30% could be applied. This scheme would allow a shift
from the égalité principle toward an “equity principle.” To this
end, a bill has been introduced to the senate in April 2012 to
amend the 1982 Insurance Act. This bill defined three main goals:
(1) objectify the recognition process of natural disasters to
enhance transparency and equity, (2) encourage prevention
efforts, and (3) treat in an appropriate way the risk of subsidence.
Despite some positive signs, there have been few resulting actions.
First, the proposed act only addressed local authorities and
businesses (Impact Study Reform Insurance Act of 2012), and it
was introduced in the context of the 2012 presidential and
legislative elections, meaning that the proposed reforms were not
discussed by Parliament. Although no action has resulted, the
issues remain on the political agenda, and despite a change in
political majority, the current French government has expressed
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Fig. 2. Measures and instruments to strengthen the links between strategies.
its desire for change and in 2014 presented different reforms. These
reforms would prevent payout delays and encourage better
coordination of the actors involved in the CAT-NAT process.
Instruments to promote linkage with the mitigation strategy
In England, certain ad hoc mechanisms have been applied in
recent years to promote individual-scale mitigation strategies
following flooding. The governmental Repair and Renew Grant
is an example of an instrument that could, provided its
implementation be more adequately framed and guided, hold
promise and emerge as a good practice. Promoted following the
2013-2014 floods, a grant was introduced that offered up to £5000
specifically targeted toward resilient reinstatement. Its original
success was limited, and uptake was low caused mainly by little
awareness of potential measures, a lack of promotion of the
scheme and other organizational issues related to how to claim,
and the lack of accreditation of measures (interview with AXA
underwriting professional, United Kingdom, 2014). Despite its
limited uptake, the idea behind the grant, i.e., providing specific
funding for resilient reinstatement in the aftermath of a flood, is
conducive to a resilient recovery strategy. An approach such as
this avoids two existing barriers to the linking of FRM strategies.
First, it overcomes insurers’ concerns about increased claim costs;
that is, when interviewed, underwriters from three leading UK
insurers suggested that a current barrier was the unwillingness of
companies to pay the higher costs necessary to make a property
more resilient or resistant. Second, it circumvents the legal
barriers (see Figure 2, point 5) preventing private market insurers
working together to mandate mitigation and defense, i.e., the UK
Competition Act of 1998. The grant could, for example, also be
relevant for countries with an exclusively public ex post
compensation mechanism and assist individuals to afford
measures, either through grants or loans, to reduce their risk to
future events.
Instruments to promote public awareness
As recognized as a contributing factor to the low uptake of the
Repair and Renew Grant, public awareness is an important aspect
for FRM in general and, more specifically, with respect to the
linkages discussed. This relates to raising awareness of the
population in terms of (1) flood risks and their implications, (2)
the importance of adaptive building and resilient reinstatement,
and (3) the actions that can be taken during a flood event. Clearly,
if  a population is unaware of its flood risk and possible actions
to reduce risk, it will be difficult for individuals to act positively
and responsibly. The nature of private market insurance
mechanisms provides an annual opportunity at policy renewal to
inform policyholders of their flood risk. Attempts have been made
to raise the awareness of citizens in terms of adaptive-building
possibilities, e.g., the document on flood resilient construction for
new building works in England (ABI 2009) and in Belgium (CIW
2011). Despite the usefulness of such information dissemination
Ecology and Society 21(4): 1
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art1/
activities, these are generally voluntary. Informing roles and the
strongest links occur where specific instruments have been
developed to tackle this. In the Flemish region, the “duty to
inform” is a legal instrument in the nexus between spatial planning
and water management that requires sellers and long-term
landlords, i.e., with rental contracts exceeding a period of 9 years,
to disclose information on the flood prone character of the
building (Decree Integrated Water Policy [Decree of 18 July 2003
on Integrated Water Policy, Belgian Official Journal, 14 November
2003], article 17bis). This instrument can be considered as a good
practice in the FRM realm (Mees et al. 2016). The creation of
this instrument was induced by the concern that citizens are often
unaware of the flood prone character of the building they are
occupying or the parcel they are aiming to develop. Flood risk–
related information is required to be widely disseminated by the
property owner, the real estate broker, and the notary, e.g., as part
of every online advertisement and brochure (Decree Integrated
Water Policy, article 17bis). Once the transaction is completed,
the information should be included as a water paragraph in the
agreement in question. This instrument could be a useful addition
to legal and policy frameworks in other EU member states. In the
Flemish region, the scope of the duty to inform should be
sufficiently linked to the high-risk areas within the insurance
context specifically.  
Another example of an awareness-raising instrument is the legal
obligation in France for tenants to have coverage for natural
disasters through the household insurance policy (Law No. 89-462
[Act No. 89-462 of 6 July 1989 Aimed at Rental Relationships
Improvement], article 7). Tenants must demonstrate to the owner
that the contents are covered at the beginning of their rental
contract and, if  requested by the owner, on a yearly basis.
Pursuant to the ALUR (Accès au logement et un urbanisme
rénové) Act (Act No. 2014-366 of 24 March 2014 Related to the
Access to Housing and Urban Planning Renovated), the landlord
may replace the tenant as the policyholder if  the tenant has not
done so within a month of being notified. One of the key features
of the English Flood Re scheme should be to inform policyholders
that they have been entered into the “at risk” pool and provide
information about their level of risk and actions that could be
taken to reduce it. However, there are currently no rules within
the legislation or policy governing the scheme to ensure that this
is undertaken. Importantly, raising awareness will not resolve all
issues. As Bubeck et al. (2013) highlight, it is not only awareness
deficiencies that need to be addressed in relation to the
encouragement of the uptake of risk reduction. In their study of
households along the Rhine, inactivity and delaying action until
the future were reducing the resilience of some households. This
reinforces the need to also effectively incentivize the uptake of
these measures.
The use of bridging mechanisms
As mentioned previously, public-private stakeholder dynamics
are particularly important for linking strategies and ensuring that
approaches reinforce, rather than undermine, each other. Ex post
compensation for natural disasters, in casu floods, is different from
other insurance products. Although the degree varies, flood risk
insurance is in some way or another impacted by governmental
action, be it through flood risk cartography, spatial planning
measures, flood defense actions, or direct intervention in the ex
post compensation. If  appropriate in the country-specific settings,
existing bridging mechanisms (see Van Rijswick 2014; Gilissen et
al. 2016) between the spatial planning sector and water managers,
such as the VMM, could be reevaluated and strengthened to take
into consideration recovery. The water test, applicable in Belgium
(the Flemish region) and the Netherlands, requires that the impact
on the water system of any plan, program, or, in the Flemish
region, permit is scrutinized, and subsequent measures to mitigate
this impact are adopted. In this regard, improved information
exchange between the representative organization(s) for the
insurance industry and water managers on the one hand and the
land use and building permit-issuing authorities on the other hand
would be particularly useful.  
Besides the above-mentioned country-specific vulnerabilities and
recommendations, several, more broadly applicable, recommendations
ensue from the analysis we have presented:  
. The importance of legally enshrined mechanisms within an
ex post compensation scheme pursuant to the prevention
strategy, i.e., to prevent (re)development in high flood risk
areas. An example of this is the Belgian risk differentiation
approach (Bruggeman 2011). 
. Measures to reduce risk at an individual level through
mitigation should be more strongly and systematically
incentivized by recovery mechanisms. This might be through
structured premium increases, such as are planned as part
of Flood Re, or through requirements for obtaining
coverage (Surminski et al. 2015, Hudson et al. 2016). This
recommendation implies that more research needs to be
done to scrutinize and raise awareness of possible risk
reduction measures and their (cost)effectiveness, and that
greater clarity about possible premium reductions is needed
(Ball et al. 2013). 
. Specific legal or policy instruments to enhance the awareness
of flood risks on the nexus between spatial planning,
adaptive building management, and water management
should be developed, establishing better links with the ex
post compensation mechanisms. For example, the above-
mentioned duty to inform that exists in the Flemish region,
as illustrated previously, is a versatile instrument that could
be interesting for other countries to scrutinize (Mees et al.
2016).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have engaged with the existing literature on recovery
mechanisms and their use for enhancing resilience from flood
risks (among others: Kunreuther 1996, Michel-Kerjan 2001,
Faure 2007a, Botzen and Van Den Bergh 2008, Crichton 2008,
Faure and Bruggeman 2008, Mehlhorn and Hausmann 2012,
Poussin et al. 2013, Surminski et al. 2015). The research has
specifically tackled the manner in which these mechanisms
promote the adoption of preventative and mitigation measures
at the individual level. Flood recovery is generally accessed at the
individual level either through purchasing a policy or reclaiming
damages and, as such, offers a clear link to inducing or informing
other flood management decisions and responsibility taking at
the household level, a move that is advocated by many European
countries (Alexander et al. 2016, Ek et al. 2016, Kaufmann et al.
2016, Larrue et al. 2016, Matczak et al. 2016, Mees et al. 2016).
However, analysis has highlighted that although there is great
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potential to better link flood risk prevention and individual-scale
mitigation, in the four examples presented, these links are often
lacking or are ineffective. This is particularly the case for the
recovery-mitigation nexus. Currently, many of the approaches to
encourage the uptake of defense and mitigation or discourage
development are implicit and indirectly provided and, as such,
are not being maximized. The most effective links have been
created by specific instruments or requirements in legislation and
policy, and therefore, our recommendations suggest the adoption
of more targeted and mandatory linking mechanisms. Despite
not resolving all of the issues and barriers, clearer linkages
between FRM strategies provide the best chance that they will be
effectively implemented and that strategies contradicting or
undermining each other will be avoided.  
Although we have analyzed only four European recovery
approaches, these include a range of different types of insurance,
with varying degrees of public-private involvement, as well as a
compensation approach. Therefore, the analysis covers many of
the possible types of existing flood recovery mechanisms.
Consequently, many of the recommendations concerning the
strengthening of legal or policy instruments are applicable in a
wider international context. Future research could further test
the mechanisms for strengthening each of the links and identify
more specific recommendations within the national context. For
example, would better national quality standards or accreditation
for individual-scale products encourage insurers to offer premium
reductions, provide incentives, and stimulate uptake? Further
analysis of the future role of the EU in this matter should be
conducted. We have focused principally on the national-level
comparisons. An analysis of the legal feasibility of a
comprehensive EU ex post compensation scheme is beyond the
scope of this research. However, based on, for example, the
reactions of the EU member states to the 2013 green paper on
insurance for natural and anthropogenic disasters, there would
not be broad support at this time for a top-down approach and
a harmonization of insurance for natural disasters throughout
the EU (Faure and Bruggeman 2013, European Commission
2014, Surminski et al. 2015). However, rules and guidelines issued
at this level can have an important steering effect for member
states to promote these linkages. For example, the Solidarity Fund
could further enhance risk awareness and reduction at national
levels through its allocation of funds or through the reporting
obligations (Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2015). Moreover, flood risk
management plans issued in the context of the EU Floods
Directive (European Parliament, Council of the European Union
2007) could include more references on how recovery schemes are
promoting prevention and mitigation measures at individual
levels.  
In conclusion, increasing resilience to flooding on a broad scale
in the face of worsening risks will ultimately require a greater
alignment of strategies that reinforce, rather than undermine,
each other. Despite many of the inherent problems identified,
strengthening the flood risk prevention, flood recovery, and flood
mitigation triangle offers great unexploited potential for
strengthening resilience to flooding, in particular at the individual
level.  
__________  
[1] In the case of the Netherlands, we concentrate on recovery from
coastal and fluvial flooding, rather than pluvial flooding. For the
latter, insurance is provided as part of a standard household
policy, with the potential for additional flood insurance that can
be purchased as an add-on.
[2] Throughout the STAR-FLOOD project, 70 interviews have
been conducted in Belgium, 61 in England, 64 in France, and 45
in the Netherlands. These have been paramount in providing
context for the linking of the strategies we have presented.
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